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In the study of wagering markets, it is generally the case that the objective probabilities of various
contestants (horses, teams, etc.) winning do not match those implied by the betting. More often than
not favourites are underbet and longshots overbet, although some studies have found the reverse. We
offer an explanation in the case where there is imperfect competition among book-makers and
heterogeneous expectations among bettors.
JEL Classification Numbers: D45, D82, C73, G14
INTRODUCTION
In betting markets, there is extensive empirical support for the favourite-
longshot bias, the phenomenon that favourites are underbet and longshots are
overbet (the “usual” bias). The interested reader is referred to Raymond Sauer
(1998) and Richard Thaler and William Ziemba (1988) for good summaries of
this evidence. While most studies have found the usual bias, Kelly Busche and
Christopher Hall (1988) and LindaWoodland andBillWoodland (1994) find the
bias in reverse direction. The firm conclusion is that there is a bias, although, in
some markets, a reverse bias has been observed.
The effort to explain this phenomenon has been ongoing for several
decades. Most theories turn on one or more of the following characteristics:
1. Bettor Risk Preferences;
2. Information (both asymmetric and heterogeneous information); and
3. Market Micro-Structure (pari-mutuel versus a book-maker market).
For the most part, the explanations based on bettor risk preferences take the
position that bettors are risk lovers. This line of researchwould include theworkof
MartinWeitzman (1965), Mukhtar Ali (1977), Richard Quandt (1986), and Antti
Kanto, Gunnar Rosenqvist, and Arto Suvas (1992). More recently Joseph Golec
and Maurry Tamarkin (1998) have suggested that bettors prefer return skewness
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rather than risk and Kelly Busche and DavidWalls (2000) argue that bias may be
an empirical issue related to even higher moments of the return distribution.
The rest of the important contributions turn on Information and/or Market
Micro-Structure. Ali (1977) studies a two-horse race where bettors have
heterogenous expectations and the betting mechanism is pari-mutuel. He
shows that the usual bias will obtain. Stephen Blough (1994) extends Ali’s
model to the case of an n-horse race and finds that, under the condition of
symmetric heterogenous expectations, the bias will emerge. William Hurley
and Lawrence McDonough (2005) study the case of sequential pari-mutuel
betting with heterogeneous expectations and show that both the usual and
reverse biases are possible depending on the distributions of bettor beliefs.
Their sequence of bettors produces a stochastic process of pari-mutuel odds
and the steady-state behavior of this sequence is examined. In contrast, Rob
Feeney and Stephen King (2001) and Takahiro Watanabe (1997) model
sequential pari-mutuel betting as a game.
Another set of models turns on asymmetric information. These models
assume that there is a class of bettor which is more informed about the outcome
of the contest and would include the work of Hyun Shin (1992), Hurley and
McDonough (1995, 1996), LeightonVaughanWilliams andDavid Paton (1998)
and Micheal Cain, David Law, and David Peel (2003). Hurley andMcDonough
employ a pari-mutuel mechanism; the others study a book-maker market.
As for Market Micro-Structure, it is well known that the institutional
characteristics of a market are important in asset price formation. Betting
markets are no exception. These markets are organized in two main ways.
In one, trading follows the pari-mutuel mechanism where the final odds of a
bet are not known until the close of betting. In the other, book-makers stand
ready to take bets at fixed odds. The two are fundamentally different.
By way of summary, the following table classifies the literature along the
dimensions of Information and Market Micro-Structure:
Note the gap in the Book-Maker/Heterogeneous Information quadrant. Hence,
the purpose of this paper is to explore the case where betters
have heterogeneous beliefs and the book-maker market is imperfectly
competitive.
Asymmetric Information Heterogeneous Information
Pari-mutuel Hurley/McDonough (1995) Ali (1977)
Mechanism Hurley/McDonough (1995) Blough (1994)
Feeney and King (2001)
Hurley/McDonough (2005)
Watanabe (1997)
Book-Maker Shin (1992)
Williams/Paton (1998)
Cain/Law/Peel (2003)
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We consider the case of a single book-maker behaving as a profit-
maximizing monopolist. For our two-horse race, bettor expectations on the
favourite horse are modelled as drawings from a probability distribution
centered on the favourite’s objective probability of winning. That is, the mean
of the distribution is equal to the favourite’s objective probability of winning.
Each bettor examines the prices set by the book-maker (contingent claims
paying $1) and his beliefs to determine which horse to bet. Given these
assumptions, we show that the usual and reverse biases can occur depending
on the distribution of bettor beliefs. To our knowledge, this model is the first to
produce the bias in both directions. We will show that this direction depends
critically on the distribution of bettor beliefs.
We contrast this result to the case where book-makers behave as Bertrand
competitors and show that there is no bias regardless of the nature of bettor
expectations. We conclude that a real-world book-maker market is likely to lie
somewhere between these two extremes of monopoly and pure competition.
That is, if there is not some degree of book-maker cooperation, there might
well be some other market imperfection such as bettor search cost which has
the same effect. Consequently, our model predicts that there will be a bias,
either reverse or usual, and the size of the bias will depend fundamentally on
the distribution of bettor beliefs.
A SINGLE MARKET-MAKER
Consider a horse race where there are only two horses - a Favourite and a
Longshot. The true probability that the Favourite wins is p
F
. 1=2; the
probability that the Longshot wins is p
L
¼ 12 p
F
: We assume our book-
maker (market-maker, MM) knows these true probabilities. The MM is
prepared to take bets on the both horses. For a price of p
F
, a bettor is entitled
to $1 if the Favourite wins and 0 otherwise. For a price ofp
L
; a better gets $1 if
the Longshot wins and 0 otherwise. Hence the MM offers two simple
contingent claims.
Wemodel bettor behavior as follows. There areN possible bettors whereN
is large. We assume bettor i’s expectation,
~
p
i
, is formed by a random drawing
from a distribution with density function gðÞ and a corresponding cumulative
density function GðÞ. Hence our bettors have heterogeneous beliefs for a
particular race, but we insist that they be unbiased. Mathematically we require
that
Eð
~
p
i
Þ ¼ p
F
for all i:ð1Þ
That is, for a large number of betters, we have that
~
p
1
þ
~
p
2
þ · · · þ
~
p
N
N
pr
! p
F
:ð2Þ
Equivalently, the average of bettor beliefs gets arbitrarily close to p
F
as N gets
large. Note that each bettormakesmistakes on individual races, but over a large
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number of identical races, the average of his estimates converges on the
Favourite’s objective probability of winning.
We assume that bettors wager simultaneously and with hubris. That is,
each makes the assumption that he/she is the only one among the throng of
bettors who is able to interpret the available information correctly. Hence,
each takes the MM prices as given and does not update his/her beliefs on the
basis of these prices. Moreover, the MM posts his/her prices once at the
beginning of betting and does not change them as betting progresses. Even if
we were to assume sequential betting, the MM could not learn anything from
the betting since bettor expectations are assumed to be independent.
For the moment we are going to make a second assumption that gðÞ is
symmetric about p
F
:
gð p
F
2 xÞ ¼ gð p
F
þ xÞ for all x . 0:ð3Þ
This implies that g has a median at p
F
:
Gð p
F
Þ ¼
1
2
:ð4Þ
We also assume that bettors will wager only if the expected return of a bet is
nonnegative. For instance, consider bettor i. His expected return on the
Favourite is
r
F
i
¼ 1
~
p
i
2 p
F
¼
~
p
i
2 p
F
ð5Þ
and on the Longshot,
r
L
i
¼ 1ð12
~
p
i
Þ2 p
L
¼ 12
~
p
i
2 p
L
:ð6Þ
He will choose the wager which gives the highest return provided this return is
nonnegative. We can show that the Favourite will be bet if
~
p
i
$ p
F
;ð7Þ
and the Longshot if
~
p
i
# 12 p
L
:ð8Þ
The MM’s expected profit is the sum of two parts, a profit on Favourite
betting, and one on Longshot betting. The MM’s expected revenue on the
Favourite isp
F
ð12 Gðp
F
ÞÞN and his payout is $1 for each of the ð12 Gðp
F
ÞÞN
bettors on the Favourite. Since this payout happens with probability p
F
; the
MM’s expected profit on the Favourite is
N p
F
ð12 Gðp
F
ÞÞ2 ð12 Gðp
F
ÞÞp
F
f g
¼ N ðp
F
2 p
F
Þð12 Gðp
F
ÞÞ
f g
:ð9Þ
A similar argument on the Longshot gives an expected profit of
Nðp
L
þ p
F
2 1ÞGð12 p
L
Þ:ð10Þ
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Hence total profit is
wðp
F
;p
L
Þ ¼ N ðp
F
2 p
F
Þð12Gðp
F
ÞÞ þ ðp
L
þ p
F
2 1ÞGð12 p
L
Þ
f g
:ð11Þ
Note that we have not included a cost function. Our omly assumption in this
regard is that revenues exceed the MM’s cost.
The first-order conditions for maximizing wðp
F
;p
L
Þ are
ðp
F
2 p
F
Þgðp
F
Þ þ Gðp
F
Þ2 1 ¼ 0ð12aÞ
ðp
L
2 p
L
Þgð12 p
L
Þ2 Gð12 p
L
Þ ¼ 0:ð12bÞ
For some distributions, these conditions are easily solved. For instance if
bettor expectations are uniformly distributed on the interval
p
F
2 1=2d; p
F
þ 1=2d
 '
;ð13Þ
the optimal prices are
p
*
F
¼ p
F
þ d=4
p
*
L
¼ p
L
þ d=4:
ð14Þ
It is straightforward to show that these prices satisfy the second-order
conditions. Note that the off-diagonal terms of the Hessian are 0 and hence it
is sufficient to check that
›
2
w
›p
2
F
, 0 and
›
2
w
›p
2
L
, 0:ð15Þ
Regarding the solution in (14), note that d characterizes the degree of
heterogeneity in bettor beliefs. The larger d is, the greater the degree
of differences in belief. Similar to Blough’s finding, note that the MM’s
markup is
p
*
F
þ p
*
L
¼ p
F
þ d=4þ p
L
þ d=4 ¼ 1þ d=2ð16Þ
so that, the higher the degree of heterogeneity, the larger the markup. Note as
well that MM profit at the optimal prices, w
*
¼ Nd=8; increases with the
degree of heterogeneity.
We now show that the prices which satisfy the first-order conditions give
rise to the favourite-longshot bias. To do so we first need to prove that optimal
prices have the same form as those in (14).
Lemma. Suppose bettor expectations are given by the distribution gðÞ and
that gðÞ is symmetric about p
F
: Then the MM’s optimal prices, if they exist,
have the form
p
*
F
¼ p
F
þ D
p
*
L
¼ p
L
þ D
ð17Þ
for D . 0:
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Proof. Suppose that p
*
F
¼ p
F
þ D solves (12a). Then substituting directly,
we have that
Dgð p
F
þ DÞ þ Gð p
F
þ DÞ2 1 ¼ 0:ð18Þ
But by the symmetry of gðÞ; gð p
F
þ DÞ ¼ gð p
F
2 DÞ and 12 Gð p
F
þ DÞ ¼
Gð p
F
2 DÞ: Substituting these into (19) gives
Dgð p
F
2 DÞ2 Gð p
F
2 DÞ ¼ 0:ð19Þ
Substituting D ¼ p
L
2 p
L
and p
F
¼ 12 p
L
gives
ðp
L
2 p
L
Þgð12 p
L
2 DÞ2 Gð12 p
L
2 DÞ ¼ 0ð20Þ
or
ðp
L
2 p
L
Þgð12 p
L
Þ2 Gð12 p
L
Þ ¼ 0:ð21Þ
Therefore p
*
L
¼ p
L
þ D solves (12b). Hence p
*
L
¼ p
L
þ D is optimal. A similar
argument beginning with (12b) shows that p
*
F
¼ p
F
þ D is also optimal. Note
that D must be positive to assure that profits are non-negative. And the proof is
complete.
The optimal prices are clearly biased since
p
*
F
p
*
L
¼
p
F
þ D
p
L
þ D
,
p
F
p
L
ð22Þ
and the Favourite is underbet. But what we are really interested in is the
relationship of the objective and subjective probabilities. In a pari-mutuel
setting we could infer the subjective probability on the Favourite, u
F
, from the
ratio of MM revenues on the Favourite to total revenues:
u
F
¼
p
F
Nð12 Gðp
F
ÞÞ
p
F
Nð12 Gðp
F
ÞÞ þ p
L
NGð12 p
L
Þ
:ð23Þ
Similarly, the subjective probability on the Longshot is defined
u
L
¼
p
L
NGð12 p
L
Þ
p
F
Nð12 Gðp
F
ÞÞ þ p
L
NGð12 p
L
Þ
:ð24Þ
But in bookmaker markets, we are not usually able to observe the dollar
betting volume on each horse. Normally subjective probabilities are inferred
from relative prices:
u
p
F
¼
p
F
p
F
þ p
L
ð25Þ
u
p
L
¼
p
L
p
F
þ p
L
:ð26Þ
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In the following proposition we will show that
u
F
¼ u
p
F
and u
L
¼ u
p
L
:ð27Þ
That is, the two approaches are equivalent.
Proposition. Suppose bettor expectations are given by the distribution gðÞ
and that gðÞ is symmetric about p
F
: Then, at the solution
p
*
F
¼ p
F
þ D
p
*
L
¼ p
L
þ D;
ð28Þ
the usual bias obtains:
u
F
, p
F
and u
L
. p
L
:ð29Þ
Proof. We first show that, at the optimum prices, the expected number of
bettors on the Favourite, N
F
; is equal to the expected number of bettors on the
Longshot, N
L
:
N
F
¼ Nð12 Gðp
F
ÞÞ ¼ Nð12 Gðp
F
þ DÞÞ ¼ NGðp
F
2 DÞ ¼ N
L
Hence
u
F
¼
N
F
p
F
N
F
p
F
þ N
L
p
L
¼
p
F
p
F
þ p
L
:ð30Þ
Substituting (17) gives
u
F
¼
p
F
p
F
þ p
L
¼
p
F
þ D
1þ 2D
ð31Þ
which is always less than p
F
for D . 0 and p
F
. 1=2: Similarly, we have that
u
L
¼
p
L
p
F
þ p
L
¼
p
L
þ D
1þ 2D
ð32Þ
and this is greater than p
L
when p
L
, 1=2: And the proof is complete.
It is worth noting that a common empirical finding in wagering markets is
that book-makers try to balance the betting capital among all horses and this
can be interpreted as a risk averse strategy. (John Fingleton and Patrick
Waldron (1996)). Our model’s results are consistent with this finding.
Moreover, if the Favourite wins, his net expected revenues are
R
F
¼ N
F
p
*
F
þ N
L
p
*
L
2 N
F
¼ N
F
p
*
F
þ p
*
L
2 1
 
¼ 2DN
F
ð33Þ
and if the Longshot wins, they are
R
L
¼ N
F
p
*
F
þ N
L
p
*
L
2 N
L
¼ N
F
p
*
F
þ p
*
L
2 1
 
¼ 2DN
F
¼ R
F
:ð34Þ
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Also note that, at the optimum,
p
*
F
þ p
*
L
¼ p
F
þ Dþ p
L
þ D ¼ 1þ 2D:ð35Þ
Hence, the book-maker’s expected net revenues are always positive. Our
result is that risk neutral book-makers maximize profits by balancing the
books in the case where bettor beliefs follow a symmetric distribution.
THE REVERSE BIAS IS POSSIBLE
Suppose that bettor beliefs are drawn from the density
gðxÞ ¼
2ðx2 aÞ
ðb2 aÞ
2
a # x # b:ð36Þ
This density is linear and upward sloping over the complete interval. Its
expected value is
EðXÞ ¼
1
3
aþ
2
3
bð37Þ
and its cumulative density is
GðxÞ ¼
x2 a
b2 a
 
2
a # x # b:ð38Þ
Consider an example where a ¼ :3 and b ¼ :9:At these parameter values,
the objective probability that the Favourite wins is
p
F
¼ EðXÞ ¼
1
3
:3ð Þ þ
2
3
:9ð Þ ¼ :7:ð39Þ
The optimal prices are
p
*
F
¼ 0:8045
p
*
L
¼ 0:4333
ð40Þ
and these satisfy the second-order conditions. The subjective probability on
the Favourite at these prices is
u
F
¼ :734:ð41Þ
This is the reverse bias since the subjective probability on the Favourite, :734;
exceeds its objective probability, :7. Hence it is possible to get the reverse bias
in cases where the distribution of bettor expectations is nonsymmetric.
CONCLUSION
It is difficult to conceive of competing MMs as Cournot competitors.
Hence we consider the case where they are Bertrand competitors who compete
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fiercely on price to the point where each makes zero profit. We can show that
the Bertrand outcome is p
F
¼ p
F
and p
L
¼ p
L
, and profits for both MMs are
zero at these prices. Moreover, at these prices, there is no bias, that is,
u
F
¼ p
F
.
The nature of real-world competition in book-maker markets suggests that
reality is probably somewhere between pure monopoly and the Bertrand
outcome. But the bias is 0 only at the Bertrand outcome. Hence, any
imperfection in book-maker competition will produce a bias. The direction of
this bias will depend critically on the distribution of bettor expectations. Our
model suggests that it would be highly unlikely that we not observe a
favourite-longshot bias in these markets.
An explanation of the longshot-favourite bias should attempt to reconcile
three generally observable facts:
1. the bias is usually positive but may be negative in rare instances;
2. book-makers tend to balance their books; and
3. individual bettors have different beliefs about the outcome of the event
they are betting on.
The model developed here either assumes or implies these features. By
implication, attribution of any empirical measure of bias to informational
asymmetry must be interpreted with caution. Indeed there may be no way to
differentiate between informational asymmetry and imperfect competition as
sources of bias.
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